THE PLACE OF POLICY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Elihu Lauterpacht
This is rather a large topic that we are discussing this morning. I think
I should say straightaway that I rather deprecate this establishment of
a divergence between English and American attitudes on this subject. I
did not know how to approach it when I began to prepare myself to
participate, but as I have thought of it and as I have listened to the talks
of my colleagues here, I fail to perceive any fundamental difference of
approach. It is a pity that we should think in such terms. Our attitudes
are basically the same. It may be that we are not doing things in quite
the same way. Perhaps it is a sort of race-some are hares and some
are tortoises! (You will be able to categorize me perhaps presently!)
The idea of relating the roles of law and policy in international law
suggests a dichotomy between the notion of law and the notion of policy
which bears a little closer scrutiny. One tends to say: Well, I know that
the law is law; that it is certainly not "not law"; that it is something
different, for example, from ex aequo et bono; and that therefore it is
also different from policy. This is a very nice, simple approach which it
would be wise to adopt when first approaching the subject. On the other
hand, it would be wrong to ignore the valuable work that has been done
by those whose disciplines have spread wider than the relatively narrow
range of law. They have led us to understand that, when dealing with
international law, it is difficult to point to anything and say, "That is
the law," because on virtually any topic one may care to select, one will
find that there are substantial "gray" areas, marginal areas of imprecision which have to be completed by a creative process; and in that
creative process, of course, there must be room for policy. So when one
is dealing with those areas, one cannot always distinguish clearly between law and policy. Indeed, some go so far as to say that law and
policy are but two words to describe different factors which are employed in this process of reaching decisions.
I apologize for being somewhat elementary in my approach. Perhaps
it is because I have not been deeply involved in the kind of thinking in
which we are collectively participating today. I fear that something
which Dr. Higgins has written may at any rate in part be applicable to
me. In her admirable article in InternationalOrganizationrecently upon
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"Policy and Impartiality: The Uneasy Relationship in International
Law," she has a footnote in which she comments on English attitudes
towards the role of policy. There she says: "Unlike in the United Kingdom [she is contrasting this with something she had said in the main
text] where there is little interest in, and a certain hostility to, the notion
of international law as an instrument for the promotion of community
policies. The tendency is rather to regard law as a neutral set of rules,
the impartial application of which will guarantee protection of the weak
and strong alike."'
It may be that that comment is applicable to people like me. Certainly
I have myself been a trifle antipathetic to examining too closely the
relationship of law and policy. Now, I ask myself, why am I antipathetic
to this examinition? Partly it is because the relationship is so difficult
to unravel. The answer also lies in something which Dr. Schachter mentioned earlier when he listed the various objections to the role of policy:
that is, because of the "subjective" element in the application of policy.
It may well be that policy considerations are unavoidable in the field of
international law. It is quite true that we should recognize that. But very
often (and this also relates to what Professor Johnson has said about
vocabulary) it is more than this; the analysis of the role of policy involves
considerations which are simply not part of my legal habit. Perhaps I
could be specific by illustrating the difficulties which occur to me in
relation to the subjective element in policy.
When we talk about the role of policy in law, we have to ask ourselves,
whose policy? There are various possibilities. There is the possibility that
we are talking about the policy of a particular state which is invoked
for the purpose of determining the content of a rule of law which may
operate either in its favor or against it. For example, some may say that
the Soviet Union, when it invades Hungary or Czechoslovakia, is applying considerations of policy to the determination, as it understands it,
of rules of law which are applicable in the situation. That is a highly
individual determination of state policy. Or to take perhaps a more
helpful illustration: When one comes to the law of the sea, a state may
take the view that it is desirable that it should enjoy a substantial belt
of territorial waters in excess, say, of 12 miles. The considerations which
lead it to that view are of course considerations of policy dependent on
its own fishing or mineral interests. So again it is state policy.
'Higgins, Policy and Impartiality: The Uneasy Relationship in International Law, 23
914, 920 n.21 (1969).
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Apart from state policy, you have a second possibility: that is, that
you can talk about a "community" policy. I think this is one of the
important factors of which Dr. Schachter was speaking earlier. You can
have a community policy which can be invoked in a certain context for
the purpose of assisting in the formulation of the relative rule of law.
One illustration of this may be taken from the proceedings in the
Barcelona Traction Case, 2 of happy memory. One issue in that case, as
you will remember, was whether Belgium, as the national state of certain
shareholders in a Canadian company, was entitled to bring proceedings
in the International Court of Justice arising out of a wrong initially done
to the company, but effectively injuring the shareholders. It is worthwhile bearing in mind that this was an area of law upon which there was
no clear authority, no express judicial decision, so that whatever decision
the International Court might reach would necessarily involve some
element of law creation: if you will, of the application of policy.
I recall that when, on behalf of the Government of Belgium, I was
arguing this point before the Court, I adduced some material to demonstrate that from the point of view of the benefit of the community at
large, it was desirable to extend the range of protection from merely
protecting companies to protecting also the shareholders in those companies. The elements in the argument were that by extending such protection, the Court would encourage the flow of private investment funds
and that this would of course assist developing countries. I put it in terms
of what may be called "community" policy.
All of you will know that the argument failed. But there must have
been some counterpolicy that carried more weight than the one which I
have just suggested to you. As I understand it, the counterpolicy was a
very simple one. It was this: There are on the whole in this world more
states that are likely to be wrongdoers in this particular area than there
are states that are going to be right-doers. In other words, it is quite wise
not to lower the barriers that stand in the way of the establishment of a
state's responsibility. As a matter of policy, let us maintain as rigidly
as possible the old law on nationality of claims so as to protect developing countries from oppressive action by investors from larger and more
powerful nations. This is a counter consideration of policy-the policy
of particular states, but of so many states that it can be said to represent
a type of community interest, but not the interest of the whole community.
'Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Case, [1970] I.C.J. 3.
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Both these types of policy-the policy of the state, or the policy of
the community-are, in my assessment, too subjective to be of great
value to us, although obviously in any given context it is worthwhile
trying to calculate what the policy elements are.
On the other hand, there are two other types of policy which are
perhaps worthwhile identifying because in relation to them there is less
room for subjectivity.
The first has been touched on by Dr. Schachter. One can speak of it
as the policy of an international organization. An international organization is controlled by its constitution. Problems arise in the application
of that constitution. They have to be determined either by the members
of the organization, by the secretariat, or by an international tribunal.
All of this involves the interpretation of the constitution. Frequently the
constitution is incomplete. Again, a law-creating function has to be
performed which involves the application of a policy. What policy? The
answer is that if one looks, for example, at the jurisprudence of the
International Court, one finds that the Court is applying the policy of
the organization-not the policy of any particular state, but a policy
which is intended to fulfill the purposes for which the organization itself
was created. The standard illustrations of this are to be found in those
cases which deal with the doctrine of implied powers, the Advisory
Opinions on Reparationsfor Injuries3 and on the Binding Force of
A wards of the United Nations Administration Tribunal.' The Court was
in both those situations extending the reach of the purely literal contents
of the constitution by the importation and application of policy considerations derived from the character and purpose of the organization
itself.
The fourth type of policy which may be mentioned as being acceptable
because, like the one just spoken of, it is less subjective is the policy of
the law itself. Those of us who profess the law do so, I suppose, because
we are attracted by the notion of the law's integrity, its predictability,
its objectivity. So there are certain situations in which a particular
course of conduct can raise in our minds the question of whether those
criteria of integrity, predictability, and objectivity are being maintained.
You will, I am sure, recall the circumstances in which the so-called
'automatic reservation," attached to the United States' acceptance of
3

Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
[1949] I.C.J. 174.
'Advisory Opinion on the Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal, [1954] I.C.J. 47.
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the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, 5 was first questioned. It was
questioned by reference to this very class of consideration. What is the
policy of the law itself in relation to a declaration which seeks to withhold from the Court a particular category of dispute at the instance of
the defendant state? It could be said that this criticism of the United
States Declaration is in part a logical application of strict legal principle
rather than an application of legal policy. But I tend towards the latter
interpretation.
Another illustration of this same idea of the policy of the law (I think
it is one which will ring a bell with Professor Falk) is that the policy of
the law itself demands that there should be within each national system
an effective way for the national courts to apply rules of international
law in those cases where they may arise. In other words, the policy of
international law, I would suggest, runs against the strict application of
what we have come to know in the United States doctrine as the "act
of state" concept. The policy of international law requires that wherever
international law is relevant to an issue in litigation, be it in an international tribunal or, for our present purposes, in a municipal tribunal, this
policy requires that international law should be capable of full application. International law should not be excluded by reference to some
notion that the courts of one state will not sit in judgment upon the
public acts of another state.
It seems to me that one is entitled to derive considerations of policy
from the nature of law itself, and that one can legitimately apply them
to the content of the law without being exposed to the charge of excessive
subjectivity.
It may perhaps strike you that I am taking a rather narrow view of
the problem of the relationship of law and policy. I have to do this,
because otherwise I would have to go on very much longer. But it seems
to me that in answering this general question about the relation of law
and policy, one is really obliged to identify the discipline to which one
belongs. I see no reason why people who have gone through the discipline
of the law should fail to take pride in it. That discipline involves of
necessity an exclusion of nonlegal considerations-though not a total
exclusion, because, as I hope I have adequately demonstrated, nonlegal
considerations have a part to play in the identification of legal rules. But
if one is a lawyer, I believe one is a lawyer first and foremost. That is
'Declaration of the United States Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, Aug. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1598, I U.N.T.S. 9.
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not to deny that there is room for association with other disciplines or
that it is proper to apply other disciplines to measure the adequacy of
the content of the law. But in doing so, my plea would be that we should
at any rate identify the disciplines which we invoke and be able to define
reasonably clearly what are the elements with which we are concerned.
None of this, I venture to suggest, leads to a total exclusion of policy
considerations from the law. I would hope that the sort of observations
I have made this morning would confirm what I started out by saying:
that there really is no fundamental divergence of attitudes between those
of us who profess the subject in England and our colleagues in the United
States.

